ENGEL FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED WITH UPDATE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/29/2016 2:16 PM

Why Not a Regional Approach to State
Renewable Power Mandates?

KIRSTEN H. ENGEL*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.
VI.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 80
STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: THE
PREVALENCE OF THE “GO IT ALONE” APPROACH ................................................. 85
A. Similar Design Features Mask a Wealth of Difference in Detail ............... 86
B. State RPS Geographic Location Restrictions............................................. 87
C. The Motivation Behind the State-Centered Approach................................ 91
LEGAL RISKS ....................................................................................................... 92
A. Escalating Legal Risk? .............................................................................. 92
B. Recent Developments in the Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence ................................................................................ 94
1. Rejuvenation of the Traditional Governmental Function Test ............ 95
2. Expansion of the Market Participant Doctrine Exemption ................. 97
C. Validity of In-state Location Preferences in State RPS Law ...................... 98
THE CASE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH TO RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS ..................................................................................... 100
RECS TO REFLECT OUT-OF-STATE GENERATION ............................................... 102
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 104

* Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
The author wishes to thank all of the participants in the University of San Diego School
of Law’s Third Annual Climate & Energy Law Symposium: Advancing a Clean Energy
Future (April 15, 2011) but especially Lincoln Davies who was kind enough to review
earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks is also due Seth Kaplan and Jerry Elmer from
the Conservation Law Foundation for sharing their knowledge of developments in the
law of state renewable portfolio standards.

79

ENGEL FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED WITH UPDATE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/29/2016 2:16 PM

I. INTRODUCTION
Dismayed at the slow progress being made in reducing the nation’s
reliance on fossil fuels, many scholars have decried the divergence
between energy and environmental law.1 An especially illustrative example
of this divide is found in the differing geographic scope of programs
designed to cap greenhouse gases, on the one hand, and programs
designed to grow the market for renewable energy, on the other.
With respect to greenhouse gas reductions, many states are adopting a
regional approach. Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative,2 the Midwest Accord,3 and the Western Climate Initiative,4 each
of which embody a regional approach to greenhouse gas reductions. In
contrast, renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), currently the most
powerful engine for the growth of renewable power,5 remain primarily
1. Lincoln Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect,
46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 475-99 (2010); Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a
Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010).
2. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited July
13, 2011). There are ten founding members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(“RGGI”): Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. However, Governor Chris Christie
of New Jersey recently announced that his State would withdraw from RGGI by the end
of the 2011. See Christopher Baxter, Gov. Christie Announces N.J. Pulling Out of
Regional Environmental Initiative, NJ.COM (May 28, 2011), http://www.nj.com/politics/
index.ssf/2011/05/gov_christie_to_announce_nj_pu.html. Meanwhile, the State of New
York is being sued by an oil-industry funding organization in an effort to end New
York’s participation in RGGI as well. See Mireya Navarro, Group Sues to End N.Y.’s
Role in Regional Cap-and-Trade, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2011), http://green.blogs.ny
times.com/2011/06/29/group-sues-to-end-n-y-s-role-in-regional-cap-and-trade/.
3. See Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord 2007, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR SCOTT
WALKER (2007), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=12497.
Signatories of the Accord are Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas
and the Canadian Province of Manitoba. Observers of the Accord are Indiana, Ohio, and
South Dakota, as well as the Canadian Province of Ontario. Implementation of the
Accord was put on hold in 2009, pending what was considered to be imminent action by
the U.S. Congress to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Although Congress did not act,
at least one climate watchdog group reports that the Accord is not being implemented.
See Emily Kelchen, Midwest Climate Accord Abandoned, GREAT LAKES LEGAL FOUND.
REGULATORY WATCH (Jan. 4, 2011), http://gllf-regwatch.org/index.php?q=blog/2011/01
/04/midwest-climate-accord-abandon ed.
4. See W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited
July 12, 2011).
5. For instance, from 1999 through 2010, 63% of the wind power capacity built
in the United States was located in states with renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”)
policies. Existing RPS programs are projected to increase annual average renewable
energy additions by 4–6 gigawatts (“GW”) per year between 2011 and 2020. In the
aggregate, existing state RPS policies are estimated to require roughly 100 GW of new
renewable capacity by 2035, which represents 7% of total U.S. retail electricity sales in
that year and 32% of projected load growth between 2000 and 2035. See Ryan Wiser &
Mark Bolinger, 2010 Wind Technologies Market Report, DEP’T OF ENERGY 62–63 (June
2011), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/51783.pdf.
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the product of states working largely independently of each other. State
RPSs expand the market for renewable power by requiring utilities to
obtain a certain share of their energy from renewable sources. As of this
writing, 26 states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have
adopted a mandatory RPS requiring energy suppliers to demonstrate a
minimum percentage of renewable energy in their energy portfolio.
Four other states have alternative energy portfolio standards that allow
suppliers to comply with a broader set of energy resources. Eight other
states have adopted a voluntary, as opposed to a mandatory, standard.6
Although many states employ regional organizations for the registration of
renewable energy credits (“RECs”), unlike greenhouse gas emissions
limits, states have yet to join together to adopt uniform RPS requirements
within a specific region. Instead, although not always unique, each state
that has enacted an RPS has its own renewable energy target, its own
standards for what type of energy generation satisfies the renewable
energy mandate, and, perhaps most importantly, its own rules for favoring
renewable energy generated within the territorial borders of the state.
This last aspect of state RPSs has the most parochial effect of any of
the differences among state standards. Just about every state imposes
either a geographic location restriction or a location incentive in an attempt
to steer utilities toward the purchase of renewable power generated within
the state.7 Such location restrictions are often implemented through the
state’s rules and regulations governing RECs—environmental commodities
used by suppliers to comply with the RPS mandate of a given state.8

6. See CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org
(last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
7. For example, the Western Renewable Energy Generation Information System
(“WREGIS”) is an independent renewable energy tracking system that tracks the
generation and trade of the renewable energy generated within those western states that
are members of WREGIS. See W. R ENEWABLE E NERGY G ENERATION INFO. SYS.,
http://www.wregis.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). For a discussion of the importance
of a regional tracking system to the integrity of the renewable energy credit (“REC”)
compliance mechanism to state RPS laws, see Matthew McDonnell, Kirsten H. Engel &
Ardeth Barnhart, The Potential and Power of Renewable Energy Credits to Enhance Air
Quality and Economic Development in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
8.
According to the excellent definition provided by researchers at the Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, “a REC is created when a megawatt-hour of renewable
energy is generated, is a purely financial product, and can be traded separately from the
underlying electricity generation. REC transactions create a supplemental revenue stream for
renewable generators, and allow retail suppliers to demonstrate compliance with an RPS
by purchasing RECs in lieu of directly purchasing renewable electricity.” See Ryan
Wiser & Galen Barbose, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States: A Status

81

ENGEL FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED WITH UPDATE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/29/2016 2:16 PM

RECs may accompany the electricity produced by the renewable resource
(in which case the REC is said to be “bundled” with the renewable
energy), or generators may sell the RECs separate from the electricity (in
which case the REC and the renewable energy are referred to as
“unbundled”).9 In states whose RPS incorporates geographic restrictions
or in-state incentive provisions, the law usually requires either that the
RECs used to satisfy the state RPS is “bundled,” or that the RECs represent
renewable energy generated within the state or sold to consumers within
the state.10
Not surprisingly, restrictions upon where eligible renewable power
can be generated undermine the potential efficiency of the expanded
renewable energy markets created by state RPS laws. Take, for instance,
the situation where, due to less windy conditions, wind energy generated
within one state is twice as expensive as wind energy generated in a
nearby state. By restricting the wind energy that satisfies the state’s RPS to
wind energy generated within the state’s borders, the state’s ratepayers pay
more than they would for wind energy generated in the nearby state.
Eliminating such geographic restrictions—by allowing, in the provided
example, utilities to satisfy the state RPS with wind energy generated in a
neighboring state—increases the efficiency of the renewable energy
market, resulting in the generation of more renewable energy for the same
(subsidized) price.
More than efficiency is at stake. The legality of those state RPS laws
that incorporate a geographic restriction may be in the mix as well. The
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from discriminating against,
or imposing an undue burden upon, interstate commerce for the benefit
of its residents.11 Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court has already
invalidated state regulation of electricity that discriminates in favor of
state ratepayers.12 Hence, geographic location restrictions upon the source
of the renewable power used to satisfy a state’s RPS risks constitutional
challenge.

Report with Data Through 2007, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB. 2 n.3 (Apr. 2008),
available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e.pdf.
9. See Bruce Elder, Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) in California, UNIV. OF
SAN DIEGO 7 (June 2007), available at http://www.sandiego.edu/epic/research_reports/
documents/070625_RECs_SB107_FINAL_000.pdf (discussing the nature of “bundled”
and “unbundled” RECs).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 21–43.
11. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978).
12. New England v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) (“The order of the
New Hampshire Commission, prohibiting New England Power from selling its hydroelectric
energy outside the State of New Hampshire, is precisely the sort of protectionist regulation
that the Commerce Clause declares off-limits to the states.”).
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Some have suggested a national RPS as an antidote to the inefficiency
of state-level RPS programs.13 A national RPS would address these
inefficiencies by broadening the renewable power market, enabling trades
from coast to coast. Better yet, a national RPS would offer policy
consistency across states and impose a renewable energy mandate in the
twenty states that currently lack an RPS. Nevertheless, efforts to pass a
national RPS have failed repeatedly in Congress.14 Experts disagree
over whether a national RPS is currently politically feasible.15
One major stumbling block to a national RPS is that not all states
would benefit similarly under a national program. Thus the idea of
a national RPS suffers from the very same reason that states continue to
impose geographic restrictions upon the location of renewable power
satisfying the state mandate: states seek a return on their investment in
renewable power. After all, a RPS is a ratepayer-based subsidy for
renewable power. Geographic restrictions upon qualifying renewable
energy are understandable attempts by states to receive a quid pro quo—
benefits in the form of jobs, taxes and a renewable energy business sector.
Why should a state pour ratepayer dollars into supporting renewable
power generated in a nearby state, rather than in its own?
While leading to inefficiencies, state restrictions upon the generation
location of renewable energy exist to ensure that the state reaps
economic development benefits associated with the state’s subsidy of
renewable power through the state RPS. Without this incentive, it is
possible that state support for a RPS would diminish. True, all states
enjoy the climate change mitigation that accompany the displacement of
fossil fuel generated electricity with renewable resource generated
electricity, regardless of whether any renewable power generators are
actually located within their borders. However, given that there is little
to prevent a state from free-riding off of the provision of this benefit by
13. See Lincoln Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010).
14. In 2009, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee passed a bill
that included a national renewable energy standard (“RES”) of 15% by 2021. However,
this bill failed to gain approval from the full Senate. Also in 2009, the House passed the
Waxman-Markey climate bill, which contained a more aggressive national RPS–20% by
2020. Nevertheless, the House and Senate failed to agree on a climate bill and hence the
national RPS was never signed into law.
15. But see Brian Walsh, Can Congress Pass a Renewable Portfolio Standard?,
TIME (July 26, 2010), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/07/26/can-congress-pass-arenewable-energy-standard/ (reporting that the same Republican congressional leaders
that oppose a national carbon cap can support enactment of a national RES).
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other states, this climate change mitigation benefit is likely undervalued
by state policymakers. In suggesting that states organize themselves into
regional trading regimes, this article seeks a response to the economic
inefficiencies and legal threats attending the current state-level approach
in which states do not want to give up—or at least not give up entirely—
the economic development benefits associated with state support of
renewable power. The logic for regional trading regimes is simple.
First, a regional renewable energy market is more efficient than a statelevel market and hence ratepayers should pay less where utilities are
allowed to comply with state RPS mandates with renewable power
generated or delivered into the region, as opposed to being limited to
complying with power generated within or delivered within the state.
Second, all of the states within a given area stand to gain economically
from a strong regional market in renewable energy. There is at least the
potential that, in the aggregate, the economic development benefits
from a strong regional renewable power market exceeds the sum of the
region’s individual state renewable power markets. Finally, given that
many of the benefits of renewable power generation are regional,
regional-level restrictions upon the generation of renewable energy
likely have a better chance of withstanding Commerce Clause scrutiny
than state-level restrictions.
There still remains the tricky question of how to implement a regional
approach to renewable energy markets. To form a regional market,
states must allow energy suppliers to comply with the state RPS through
the use of RECs generated in other states within the same region. States
may be unwilling to do so unilaterally. Hence adoption of a regional
approach will require collective agreement on the part of all of the states
in a given region that they will each repeal restrictions or incentives for
energy suppliers to purchase renewable energy generated in-state, and
replace such restrictions and incentives with those that at most favor the
purchase of renewable power generated within the same region.
This brings us back full circle to the states’ regional agreements to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such agreements can serve as models
for regional agreements with respect to state subsidization for renewable
energy. Thus far, the most successful regional agreement for greenhouse
gas emissions cuts is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”).
Under RGGI, ten northeastern states jointly agreed to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from their own electricity sectors.16 The agreement
among all of the states in the region to independently impose greenhouse
16. Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, REG’L
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/
mou_final_12_20_05.pdf.
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gas emission standards prevents the import of electricity from any other
state within the region from undercutting the environmental benefits of
the regional scheme.17
There is much to be said in favor of a regional approach with respect
to renewable energy mandates. First, uniformity in the particulars of
state RPS laws would assist the growing interstate renewable energy
market. Second, allowing renewable power that is generated anywhere
but delivered locally to satisfy the RPS of any of the states within the
region, should enhance the reliability of the market for renewable power,
increase the amount of intermittent power accommodated by the grid,
and lower the price of renewable power. Each of these effects will
strengthen the regional market for renewable power to the overall benefit
of each state within the region. Finally, while facial prohibitions upon
the eligibility of power generated outside the region to satisfy a state
RPS are likely to be considered just as repugnant to the dormant Commerce
Clause as prohibitions upon electricity generated out-of-state, the same
is likely not true with respect to non-facially discriminatory provisions
designed to protect a regional, as opposed to a state, market. This is
primarily because many of the benefits of such a provision—especially
the air quality benefits—would be sustained by the entire region, as opposed
to any particular state.
II. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: THE PREVALENCE
OF THE “GO IT ALONE” APPROACH
While there are considerable similarities between state RPS laws and
policies, what is remarkable, especially in view of the trend toward
regional regulation in greenhouse gas emissions limitations, is the extent
to which RPS policies are a product of state-level concerns and priorities.

17. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 16; see also Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative Model Rule, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Dec. 31, 2008), available
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf.
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A. Similar Design Features Mask a Wealth of
Difference in Detail
Commentators have remarked upon the similarity in the design
features incorporated into just about every state RPS.18 True enough, all
RPSs require suppliers located within the state (and often other entities
as well) to procure a minimum percentage or amount of electricity
generation or capacity from renewable resources by a particular date,
with such percentage usually increasing over time until it hits a
designated threshold at some future date.19 Similarly, each RPS usually
specifies the type of renewable resources that satisfies the minimum
percentage or amount of renewable energy required, and also the entities
subject to the mandate.20 Finally, each RPS specifies how compliance
will be determined; whether through a demonstration of the purchase of
a minimum number of RECs or through power purchase agreements with
renewable energy generators.21
But the superficial similarity in the design elements of state RPS laws
masks great diversity in whether the renewable standard is mandatory or
voluntary, the types of resources that qualify as renewable, the scope of
the requirements, and the means by which compliance with program
requirements are achieved and monitored.22 For instance, virtually all
state RPSs are satisfied by core renewable resources such as wind, biomass,
methane, photovoltaic solar generators and thermal solar generation.
However, a slightly smaller number of states also give credit for geothermal
generation and landfill gas.23 Additionally, several states allowed electricity

18. See, e.g., Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS 5 (June
2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf.
19. See generally DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (presenting a comprehensive list of
the renewables percentage target applicable under each state’s RPS).
20. Id.
21. Id. For example, under Arizona’s RES, “utilities subject to the RES must
obtain renewable energy credits . . . from eligible renewable resources to meet 15% of
their retail electric load by 2025 and thereafter.” Arizona: Incentive/Policies for Renewable
Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.
dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=AZ03R&re=1&ee=0 (last updated
June 29, 2011).
22. For excellent (and comprehensive) overviews of the variation in state RPS
programs, see Davies, supra note 13, at 1386–90; Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 6–
10. See also Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 6 (“[D]esign variations among states are
so stark that there is even some debate over what exactly constitutes an RPS, and
whether certain states qualify as having one.”).
23. See Davies, supra note 13, at 1376.
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and/or heat from combined heat and power and/or waste heat recovery
facilities to “count” toward satisfaction of the RPS.24
Other examples of differences between state RPS laws abound. In an
effort to encourage the development of certain renewable resources,
many states offer a “credit multiplier” for these purchases. However,
states differ drastically in determining which resources receive such a
credit multiplier and the size of the multiplier. For example, Colorado
provides a 300 percent credit for solar energy, Delaware offers a 350
percent credit for offshore wind energy, and Utah affords a 240 percent
multiplier for in-state solar facilities.25
Another important difference is the manner in which states use
RECs to ensure compliance. For instance, states differ in the length of
time a REC remains viable—also referred to as the REC’s “shelf
life”—for purposes of satisfying the state RPS. Some states, such as
Arizona, place no cap on the length of time a REC is considered viable.
Other states impose caps of varying lengths, such as five years in
Colorado26 and four years in Wisconsin.27 A cap upon a REC’s shelf life
encourages the ongoing development of renewable resources, as RECs
cannot be held indefinitely and used to comply with a state’s mandate.
B. State RPS Geographic Location Restrictions
Perhaps the best demonstration of the state-centered nature of state
RPS policies is the degree to which such policies favor the in-state
generation of renewable energy. Most states use the possession of RECs
as the mechanism whereby retail suppliers demonstrate compliance with
the RPS. Hence, in most states, geographic restrictions are expressed as
conditions upon the creation of RECs for RPS compliance purposes.
With few exceptions, states organize their requirements to favor the instate generation of renewable power.

24. See also Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 8 tbl.1 (Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Nevada and North Carolina).
25. Davies, supra note 13, at 1377; see also Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 8
tbl.1.
26. Davies, supra note 13, at 1378.
27. Thomas Content, Advocates Say Wind Projects in Jeopardy, JS ONLINE (May
25, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/business/122630524.html (discussing a state bill that
would prevent the expiration of renewable energy credits even after four years and its
predicted impact of weakening the state market for renewable energy).
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The most restrictive states require each retail energy supplier to
demonstrate that its energy portfolio consists of a certain percentage of
renewable energy that is either generated by the supplier itself (as in a
vertical utility) or procured by the supplier from in-state renewable
generators. By limiting a supplier’s compliance options, the state ensures
that the renewable power used to satisfy the RPS is generally generated
in-state. Arizona,28 Hawaii,29 and Iowa,30 each follow this option.
A few other states employ a similar scheme to ensure that the
renewable power used to satisfy the state’s RPS is generated locally.
For example, although Texas allows a supplier to use out-of-state RECs
for compliance, the state requires that the energy output of the facility be
metered within Texas.31 Nevada has a similar requirement.32 Other
states provide incentives for suppliers to satisfy their RPS obligation
with renewable power generated in-state. The most direct form of incentive
is an in-state REC multiplier whereby a REC created through renewable
power generated in-state is worth a greater amount toward the supplier’s
RPS obligation than a REC created by renewable power generated outof-state. For example, Colorado has such a provision. The state counts
each kilowatt-hour (“kWh”) of renewable energy generated in Colorado
as 1.25 kilowatt-hours of energy for purposes of satisfying the state’s
RPS requirement.33
Many states use REC multipliers to encourage the development of
particular types of renewable energy—an approach that often favors
28. In Arizona, utilities may obtain bundled RECs to satisfy the state RPS requirement.
See Arizona: Incentives/Policies for Renewable Energy, supra note 21.
29. Hawaii Renewable Portfolio Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 3 (April 2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_
energy/hawaii.pdf.
30. “Iowa requires its two investor-owned utilities . . . to own or to contract for a
combined total of 105 megawatts (MW) of renewable generating capacity.” Iowa:
Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_
Code=IA01R&RE=1&EE=1 (last updated June 29, 2011).
31. Texas regulations provide that, to be eligible for credits, the output of the renewable
energy facility “must be readily capable of being physically metered and verified in
Texas by the program administrator.” The regulations further provide: “Energy from a
renewable facility that is delivered into a transmission system where it is commingled
with electricity from non-renewable resources before being metered cannot be verified as
delivered to Texas customers.” TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.173(c)(11), (e)(4) (2010).
32. Nevada Renewable Portfolio Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 5 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_
energy/nevada.pdf.
33. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. 723-3 § 3654(e) (2007). For example, Colorado grants
1.25 RECs for renewable energy generated in-state and 1.0 REC for renewable energy
generated out-of-state. Colorado: Incentives/Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE
OF S TATE I NCENTIVES FOR R ENEWABLES & E FFICIENCY , http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CO24R&re=1&ee=1 (last updated Sept. 27, 2010).

88

ENGEL FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED WITH UPDATE (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 3: 79, 2011–12]

1/29/2016 2:16 PM

State Renewable Power Mandates
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

local generation of renewable power. In Texas, for instance, a given
amount of non-wind renewable power creates twice the amount of RECs
as wind power.34 In Delaware, photovoltaic (“PV”) solar power installed
prior to 2015 will yield three times the amount of RECs as nonphotovoltaic solar power.35 Some states apply a REC credit multiplier to
distributed generation—which is renewable power generated on-site or
on a small scale.36 This also has the effect of favoring in-state renewable
energy generators.
Other states include a solar power or a distributed generation “set-aside”
in their RPS to favor in-state generation of renewable power. Under a
set-aside, some fraction of the RPS must be met through the generation
of a particular renewable technology. Sixteen states and the District of
Columbia have adopted solar or broader distributed generation set-asides
or credit multipliers as part of their RPS policies.37 In encouraging the
generation of solar power, without reducing the total amount of renewable
energy generated through a RPS, solar carve-outs are proving more
effective than credit multipliers.38
A majority of states allow the suppliers of electricity subject to the
state’s RPS to comply through the use of “unbundled RECs” or tradable
RECs (“TRECs”)—RECs that are not accompanied by a purchase of the
renewable electricity represented by the REC.39 Nevertheless, most of
these states limit the TRECs that satisfy the state RPS to RECs representing
power generated within the state or fed into the power pool serving the
state. States requiring the power be delivered into the state include
California,40 Illinois,41 Montana,42 New Mexico,43 New York,44 Ohio,45

34. Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 16 fig.8.
35. Id.
36. Id. For instance, Washington provides a 2x credit multiplier for distributed
generation.
37. See Solar Set-Asides in Renewables Portfolio Standards, DATABASE FOR STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/solarpolicy
guide/?id=21 (last visited July 14, 2011).
38. Ryan Wiser, Galen Barbose & Ed Holt, Supporting Solar Power in Renewables
Portfolio Standards: Experience from the United States, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L
LAB. 34 (Oct. 2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-3984e.pdf.
39. See Elder, supra note 9, at 7.
40. C AL . P UB . R ES . C ODE § 25741(a)–(b) (2010); C AL . P UB . U TIL. C ODE
§§ 399.12(a)–(c), (e), 399.15 (2011); see also CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13(c)–(d)
(2011).
41. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3855/1-75(c)(3) (2011).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2003(7) (2011).
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and Wisconsin.46 An in-state delivery requirement ensures that the
renewable electricity is generated either in state or in close proximity to
the state so that it can be transmitted to in-state customers.
A sizable number of states, mostly in the northeastern United States,
have adopted a regional delivery requirement. These states require only
that the renewable power be generated within or delivered into the regional
electricity distribution system serving the state. States with a regional
delivery requirement include: Connecticut,47 Maine,48 Maryland, 49
Massachusetts,50 New Hampshire,51 New Jersey,52 Pennsylvania,53 and
Rhode Island.54 Only two states—Colorado55 and Missouri56—are
reported to go further than the regional approach and permit the use of
renewable power generated from any location.57
One state, California, recently adopted a hybrid approach to RPS
compliance using a combination of bundled and unbundled RECs. In
the context of increasing the state’s RPS mandate to 33 percent, the state
will, for the first time, allow suppliers to comply with the state RPS
using TRECs.58 For suppliers, the introduction of TRECs will ease the
burden of complying with the state’s more stringent RPS. For out-ofstate renewable generators, California just opened up a new market to

43. New Mexico Renewable Portfolio Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 3 (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_
energy/new-mexico.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245(a)–(b) (West 2011).
48. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3210(2)(B)(1) (2011).
49. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. §§ 7-701(i), 7-704(a)(2) (West 2011).
50. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(1)(a)(9)(d)(1)–(2), (5)(a)–(c) (2011). To
generate energy eligible for use to comply with Massachusetts’s RPS, off-grid renewable
power generation must be located in Massachusetts and behind-the-meter generation
must be located within the ISO-NE Control Area.
51. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(IV) (2011).
52. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-2.7(b)–(c) (2011).
53. See Pennsylvania's “Alternative” Energy Law, ACTIONPA, http://www.actionpa.
org/cleanenergy/#geography (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
54. Rhode Island Renewable Energy Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 4, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/rhodeisland.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
55. Colorado Renewable Energy Standard Summary, U NION OF C ONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 4, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/ colorado.
pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
56. Missouri Renewable Energy Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 3 (NOV. 2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_
energy/Missouri.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
57. But recall that Colorado includes a REC multiplier for renewable energy generated
within the state.
58. S.B. 2, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv., 1st Ex. Sess. 2, 23 (West).
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compete for contracts to export power. To the dismay of many in the
California electricity industry, however, the state is limiting the
percentage of the obligation that can be satisfied with TRECs to just 10
percent of a utility’s obligation.59
C. The Motivation Behind the State-Centered Approach
Most states that employ the state-centered approach appear to be
motivated by the desire to reap in-state economic benefits from their
ratepayer-subsidized RPS. Such economic benefits include cleaner air
(through the displacement of air pollutants from fossil fuel-fired
electricity), jobs, taxes and the creation of a “green” image that may
attract related green-technology industries and new residents.60
Nevertheless, although valid as a rough approximation, the benefits of
a state’s RPS do not perfectly match the political boundaries of that state.
With respect to reductions in air pollution, a state’s RPS may result in
improving the air quality of another state, not its own, because the
physical laws of electricity and the nature of interconnected transmission
grids limit the ability of a state to control where in-state generated
renewable power can be directed and utilized. According to one RPS
law expert, “[a] state’s cost-benefit analysis therefore must determine
what resources will be displaced by in-state and out-of-state renewables
(in either case, the displaced resources could well be located outside the
state), and whether that displacement will cause net improvements in the
state’s air sheds, land, and waterways.”61 Nor are a state’s political
boundaries a good proxy for climate mitigation. Reductions in carbon
emissions anywhere in the world will have an equivalent impact in
mitigating climate change impacts within a state and not simply reductions
taken by the state.

59. Steven F. Greenwald & Jeffrey P. Gray, California’s New RPS: Opportunity
Squandered, POWER (July 1, 2011), http://www.powermag.com/issues/departments/legal
_and_regulatory/Californias-New-RPS-Opportunity-Squandered_3790_p2.html.
60. Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable
Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAIN. DEVEL. L. & POL’Y 10, 10 (2007). See also Kirsten H.
Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2008).
61. Nancy Rader & Scott Hempling, The Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Practical
Guide, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS 34 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/rps.pdf.
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III. LEGAL RISKS
The state-centered approach also carries legal risks. The greatest of
these risks is that state RPS laws favoring in-state generation of
renewable power might be successfully challenged on constitutional
grounds as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Granted, to
date, there has been no court ruling invalidating a state RPS law or
regulation on this basis. Nevertheless, this may be attributed to a dearth
of motivated plaintiffs as opposed to a lack of a meritorious legal basis
for such a challenge. There are many reasons a provider of renewable
power might not challenge a state’s preference for renewable power
generated in-state. Those renewable power providers located within the
state serve to benefit from the restriction and hence may have little
motivation to challenge it. Renewable power companies located outside
of the subject state may not be in a position to compete for power sales
within the state at issue and hence may have difficulty demonstrating
harm attributable to the in-state restriction. Furthermore, even if outside
providers could make such a demonstration, constitutional litigation
is expensive and even a successful result does not guarantee any
benefit. While they may succeed in invalidating an in-state geographic
preference, this does not guarantee that they will receive a contract for
the provision of power as opposed to another renewable power provider.
Hence, filing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to state RPS
geographic restrictions carries high risks and minimal benefits for a
renewable energy generator.62
Nevertheless, in just the past two years, three challenges to state RPS
geographic preferences have been filed. This may signal the rising costs
of these preference provisions to participants in the renewable energy
market. This section will discuss the status of these legal challenges in
an attempt to assess the significance of the legal risk posed by state RPS
geographic restrictions.
A. Escalating Legal Risk?
Within the past two years, three legal challenges have been filed
against state geographic location restrictions in state RPS laws.
In 2010, TransCanada, a power marketer that purchases wholesale
renewable energy and sells it to distribution companies and retail
customers in the northeastern United States, challenged geographic
62. I owe Jerry Elmer from the Conservation Law Foundation for the benefit of
these insights. E-mail from Jerry Elmer, Staff Att’y, Conservation Law Found., to Kirsten H.
Engel, Professor of Law, Univ. of Arizona James E. Rogers Coll. of Law (Sept. 3, 2010)
(on file with author).
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restrictions applicable to Massachusetts’s statutes and regulations
encouraging the generation of renewable power as a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Under one provision, the Massachusetts
Department of Energy Resources implemented a statutory requirement
that utilities purchase a portion of the RECs needed to comply with the
state’s RPS from solar generation located within the state.63 Under the
second provision challenged by TransCanada, Massachusetts required
retail electricity providers to solicit bids for long-term electricity
supply contracts from renewable generators located within Massachusetts.64
Renewable energy advocates consider long-term contracts to be of
critical importance to developers of new renewable energy projects
because they assist developers in obtaining bank financing for their
projects. Ultimately, the case was settled after Massachusetts repealed
in-state restrictions upon its solar set-aside provision.65
Also in 2010, TransCanada challenged the in-state renewables purchase
requirement accompanying the long-term contracting requirement
enacted by Rhode Island in 2009.66 Similar to the statute in Massachusetts,
the Rhode Island statute requires electric distribution companies to enter
into long-term contracts with renewable energy generators. However,
the statute articulated an explicit preference for renewable energy
generated “within the jurisdictional boundaries of the state.”67

63. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(1)(a)(1) (proposed Oct. 1, 2010). This regulation
implemented a Massachusetts statute mandating that each utility meet a portion of its
RPS requirement through “new on-site renewable energy generating sources located in
the [C]ommonwealth,” and providing the Department of Energy Resources with the
authority to “specify that a certain percentage of these requirements shall be met through
energy generated from a specific technology or fuel type.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25A,
§ 11F(e), (g) (2011).
64. Green Communities Act, S. 169, § 83 (2008). This provision required that,
beginning July 1, 2009, distribution companies must, within 5 years, solicit proposals for
long-term contracts from in-state renewable energy generators at least twice. If the
distribution companies receive “reasonable proposals,” they must “enter into cost-effective
long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of renewable energy generation within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Commonwealth.”
65. Stephen Lacey, Is Requiring In-State Generation Unconstitutional?,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (June 21, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.
com/rea/blog/post/2010/06/is-in-state-generation-unconstitutional.
66. TransCanada Power Marketing LTD’s Motion to Dismiss for Violation of
Commerce Clause, In Re: Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between
Narragansett Electric Company D/B/A National Grid and Deepwater Wind Block Island,
LLC Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-36.1.7, Docket No. 4185 (filed July 13, 2010).
67. R. I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1 (“The purpose of this chapter is to encourage and
facilitate the creation of commercially reasonable long-term contracts between electric
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Finally, the most recent, and also the most worrisome from the
perspective of state RPS advocates, is an across-the-board challenge to
Colorado’s RPS filed in 2011 by the American Tradition Institute, a
politically-conservative advocacy group.68 Although the complaint targets
the RPS in general as a violation of the Commerce Clause, several of its
more targeted allegations are noteworthy. Specifically, the complaint
challenges an aspect of Colorado’s RPS solar power set-aside that
requires half of the set-aside to originate from solar power installations
located on-site at the customer’s facilities.69 The complaint also challenges
various compliance-credit multipliers included in the law that favor instate generation of renewable power. In particular, a kilowatt-hour
obtained from renewable resources located within Colorado has a greater
compliance value than a kilowatt-hour of renewable power generated
out-of-state.70 The complaint also alleges that the Colorado RPS extends
the same preferential accounting method to renewable power generated
through community-based projects located in Colorado and to Coloradobased renewable power projects that interconnect to electric transmission
or distribution facilities owned by a cooperative electric association or a
municipally-owned utility.71
Interestingly, the American Tradition Institute lawsuit is the only legal
action to date that challenges the legality of a distributed generation setaside and an in-state credit multiplier. While the latter is fairly rare
within state RPS laws, the former is common. Hence, the lawsuit could
have broad implications for distributed generation set-aside provisions
beyond Colorado.
B. Recent Developments in the Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The basic framework of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has remained relatively unchanged in the past thirty years.
A state law that discriminates on its face against interstate commerce is
distribution companies and developers or sponsors of newly developed renewable energy
resources with the goals of stabilizing long-term energy prices, enhancing environmental
quality, creating jobs in Rhode Island in the renewable energy sector, and facilitating the
financing of renewable energy generation within the jurisdictional boundaries of the state
or adjacent state or federal waters or providing direct economic benefit to the state.”).
68. Complaint, American Tradition Institute v. Colorado, Civ. Action No. 1:11CV-00859 (D. Colo) (filed Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter “Complaint”].
69. Id. para. 68–74.
70. For instance, the Colorado RPS provides that “[e]ach kilowatt-hour of electricity
generated from eligible energy resources in Colorado . . . shall be counted as one and
one-quarter kilowatt-hours for the purposes of compliance with this standard.” COLO.
REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(III) (2011).
71. Complaint, supra note 68, para. 74.
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considered per se invalid.72 On the other hand, a state law that regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate state interest with only
“incidental” impacts upon interstate commerce is subject to a balancing
test. Under this test, the state law will be upheld unless the burden on
interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to local benefits.73
At the same time, the Court’s recent decisions indicate that the justices
are losing interest in a vigorous approach to the enforcement of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Indeed, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
proclaimed that they think the whole doctrine should be scrapped due to
the absence of a textual basis for the doctrine. Justice Scalia has stated
that he is willing to apply the dormant Commerce Clause only where
stare decisis compels him.74 It is not clear that Justice Thomas would
even go so far as to apply the doctrine where warranted by precedent.75
In any case, the reluctance of Justices Scalia and Thomas means two of
the nine justices are unlikely to strike down a state law on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds, at least if they can distinguish the case from
prior precedent. Although the other justices have not manifested this same
willingness to scrap the dormant Commerce Clause, they do seem to
have softened on the applicability of the doctrine where state or local
government has actively intervened in the private market associated with
a traditional local or state government function.
Within this context, two developments are noteworthy. First, the
Court has rejuvenated the traditional governmental functions test as an
exemption to the Clause. Second, the Court has broadened the exception
for discriminatory actions by states in their capacity as market actors.
1. Rejuvenation of the Traditional Governmental
Function Test
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has unearthed the traditional
public function test under which the Court had previously upheld local
regulations that discriminate in favor of the local government itself. In
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, in United Haulers v.
72. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
73. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
74. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“I will apply our negative Commerce Clause doctrine only when stare decisis compels
me to do so.”).
75. Id. at 361 (“I would entirely ‘discard the Court’s negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.’”) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Court upheld
flow control ordinances enacted by New York county governments that
ensured that the trash generated in the counties was delivered by private
waste haulers to solid waste processing facilities owned and run by a
government authority created by the State of New York.76 The Court
held that the ordinances were not facially discriminatory and hence were
properly analyzed under the Pike undue burden test.77
Applying the Pike test, the Court upheld the county flow control
ordinance. The decision rested on two factors. First, the Court could not
find any tangible harm to out-of-state interests resulting from the law.
Instead, the Court found that the “most palpable harm” fell upon the
very persons that voted for it in the first place—the residents of the
counties that enacted the flow control ordinances and who would thus
pay the higher fees for solid waste disposal charged by the state processing
facilities (as opposed to competitor facilities).78
Second, the Court supported its Pike analysis by rejuvenating an older
distinction since abandoned by the Court—that the ordinance was
enacted in order to benefit the localities in carrying out a “typical and
traditional concern of local government.”79 At another point in the
opinion, the Court quoted a Second Circuit decision that labels garbage
collection and disposal a “core function of local government in the
United States.”80
While the unearthing of the traditional function distinction has caught
the attention of commentators, it is not clear that its use in United
Haulers (as opposed to Dep’t of Revenue) is all that significant. The
Court clearly held that the ordinance was valid under the Pike test, based
upon the lack of a clear interstate burden, and the existence of local
benefits in the form of revenue generation and enhanced incentives for
recycling and enforcement of recycling laws. If anything, the Court’s
resort to the traditional government function rationale merely boosts the
Court’s conclusions under the Pike test.
Thus, potentially more important is the use of the traditional
government function rationale in a later case, Department of Revenue of
Kentucky v. Davis, to exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny a state
law exempting interest from bonds issued by the state (but not from

76. See, e.g., Davis, 553 U.S. 328; United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
77. United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 330.
78. Id. at 345.
79. Id. at 346–47.
80. Id. at 344 (quoting USA Recycling, Inc. v. Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275
(C.A.2 1995)).
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bonds issued by other states) from state taxes.81 In an opinion written by
the now-retired Justice Souter, the Court held that the issuance of debt
securities to pay for public projects is quintessentially a public function
and hence the tax preference was justified under United Haulers.82 The
Court was careful to point out that the tax preference benefited only a
public entity—the State—and not private participants in the market for
bonds and securities.83
2. Expansion of the Market Participant
Doctrine Exemption
The Dep’t of Revenue case is significant in another respect: by
upholding the Kentucky tax preference, the Court broadened the market
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Kentucky appeals court had rejected the market participant exception
as inapplicable to the law at issue because the state’s tax preference was
a separate regulation that, on its face, was unconnected with any
participation by the state itself in the bond market. However, the
Supreme Court rejected this as a basis for not applying the exception,
holding that it was not possible to disentangle the state’s action as a
regulator (enacting the tax preference) from its capacity as a market
participant (issuing bonds) because “imposing the differential tax scheme
makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer.”84 Hence, to
the Court, the state’s regulatory preference was part and parcel of its
market participation: “when Kentucky exempts its bond interest, it is
competing in the market for limited investment dollars, alongside private
bond issuers and its sister States, and its tax structure is one of the tools
of competition.”85
Thus, in Dep’t of Revenue, the Court expanded the market participant
exception to encompass overtly discriminatory regulatory actions that a
state or local government may undertake to assist the government entity
in its activities within the market. The fact that the Court reinterpreted
the United Haulers case as being justified by the market participant
exemption underscores this expansion. The United Haulers Court did not

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Davis, 553 U.S. at 341–42.
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id.
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rely upon this exception, presumably because the issue in the case was
the impact of government regulations—the county flow ordinances—as
opposed to the impact of actions by the state authority-run solid waste
processing facilities. However, in Dep’t of Revenue, the Court stated that
United Haulers “may also be seen under the broader rubric of the market
participation doctrine.”86 According to the Dep’t of Revenue Court, the
dispositive fact in United Haulers was the government’s own activity in
processing trash. Indeed, it was the fact of the state’s involvement in
the trash processing business that, the Court stated, distinguished the
case from the C & A Carbone case in which the Court invalidated the
challenged flow control ordinance enacted in favor of a solid waste
processing facility operated by a private company.87
C. Validity of In-state Location Preferences in
State RPS Law
Under the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis set forth
under Philadelphia v. New Jersey and its progeny, state RPS provisions
that explicitly mandate the purchase of renewable power generated instate, or that even preference renewable power generated in-state, would
appear to be unconstitutional. For example, the Massachusetts statutory
provisions at issue in the TransCanada complaint would appear to have
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The plain language of the
statute differentiated between in-state and out-of-state renewable energy
generators, specifying that only the in-state generation of solar power
could satisfy the law’s solar power set-aside, and that only contracts for
renewable energy resources generated in-state would satisfy the
Commonwealth’s long-term supply contract requirement. Thus, these
provisions plainly facially discriminated against interstate commerce in
favor of in-state firms and hence would likely have been struck down by
a court had the case not settled. The same is true with respect to the
facially-discriminatory long-term contracting provision in Rhode
Island’s RPS law.88
There is little reason to believe that traditional dormant Commerce
Clause analysis would produce a different result with respect to a law
that, like the Colorado RPS provision challenged in the 2011 lawsuit by
the American Tradition Institute, bestows a greater value upon in-state
renewable generation by applying a multiplier to only renewable energy
86. Id. at 343.
87. Id. at 346–47.
88. See also Nathan E. Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued
Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause,
and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 270 (2008).
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generated in-state. Multipliers facially discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of intrastate commerce. It matters not that the
provision at issue is in the nature of an incentive as opposed to a
regulatory mandate.89
It is possible—though unlikely—that the RPS statutory provisions at
issue in the recent litigation could be upheld based upon one of the
exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause reaffirmed in the Court’s
recent cases, i.e., discriminatory regulation that assists a state or local
government in carrying out a traditional governmental function or
participating in a market.90
To qualify for the first exception, electricity generation must be
considered a traditional government function. The Supreme Court has
never ruled on whether this is the case. Electricity generation has long
been the subject of government regulation and also government provision.
In the late 1800s, municipally-owned utilities provided street lighting
and trolley services. However, the share of electricity provided by
municipally-owned utilities never exceeded the high of 8 percent reached at
the turn of the century.91 Starting in the 1930s, the federal government
began an era of providing electric power, beginning with large reclamation
projects in the American West.92 With the addition of the Tennessee
Valley Authority, the provision of federal power reached its peak of 17
percent of total electricity generation in 1957.93 Non-federal public
power projects, consisting of cooperatives, power districts and state
projects, also grew rapidly in this time period, reaching a peak of 8.5
percent in 1960.94 Subsequent to this time period of heavy involvement by
primarily the federal government in electricity generation, the role of the
government in the provision of electricity has primarily been that of a
regulator. Whether, as a result, electricity generation qualifies as a
“traditional government function” is unclear. Certainly it has been an
important historical function of government. Nevertheless, the dominant
role of commercial entities in providing electricity indicates that the

89.
90.
91.

New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271 (1988).
Davis, 553 U.S. at 342–43.
EDISON ELEC. INST., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
THROUGH 1970 24 (2d ed. 1973).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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economics of the industry are not characterized by market failures that
would necessitate the provision of electricity by government.
To qualify for the second exception, the state discriminating in favor
of in-state renewable power would have to be a provider of renewable
electricity. In such a case, the state might argue that its regulatory
preference for renewable energy generated in-state was merely to assist
the state’s participation in the electricity market. However, in the states
favoring in-state generation of renewable power, the state government
itself is not providing the electricity. Even if it was, its regulatory
preferences for in-state renewable power generation are broader than the
simple benefit of state-run entities. In contrast, the Court made clear in
United Haulers and in Dep’t. of Revenue that the laws at issue solely
benefited the government entity participating in the market.
Hence, it is difficult to make the case that the Court’s recent dormant
Commerce Clause cases would authorize the preferences for in-state
generation of renewable power present in the RPS statutes and regulations
enacted or promulgated by Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Colorado.
With respect to the requirements in other RPS laws that the renewable
energy be delivered into the state or to state consumers, the case for
validity under the dormant Commerce Clause is stronger. Such a
requirement does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce
and hence such provisions would be analyzed under the Pike balancing
test as opposed to the per se invalidity test of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
In the context of this balancing test, the state could argue that the local
benefits flowing from such a requirement, especially reduced air pollution,
justifies whatever burden such a delivery requirement imposes upon
interstate commerce.
IV. THE CASE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH TO RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
The state-centered approach to renewable portfolio standards in which
states impose various requirements or incentives to encourage the instate generation of renewable power has several drawbacks. First, such
requirements would increase costs for state ratepayers by forcing utilities
to purchase in-state generated power even in situations where renewable
power generated out-of-state is cheaper. Second, to the extent the state’s
motivation is to benefit the overall welfare of the state by improving air
quality and encouraging the in-state generation of renewable power with
its associated promise of jobs, taxes, and spin-off businesses, research
demonstrates that such benefits are best encouraged on the regional
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level, as opposed to the state-level.95 Thus, the use of state political
boundaries as a guide to such incentives is likely to reduce the total
quantity of such benefits.
If a state-centered approach is not the most optimal method for
reaping the benefits of renewable power generation, why have so many
states adopted the approach as opposed to a larger, more regional approach?
One explanation is that, acting unilaterally, states lack any incentive to
adopt a regional approach. Insofar as a regional approach may, for instance,
lead to states allowing freely-tradable RECs to satisfy their state RPSs
(as opposed to RECs created through the generation of in-state renewable
power), why should a state unilaterally allow such RECs to satisfy its
RPS when this means utilities might satisfy the state RPS entirely through
renewable power generated out of state? States are unlikely to do so in
the absence of an assurance from other states that they are similarly
allowing for compliance with their RPS with out-of-state generated
power, thereby increasingly the likelihood that the state will benefit from
a relaxation of the state-centered approach.
The pattern of the payoffs facing states as to whether they should
allow compliance with their RPS with out-of-state generated renewable
power or only in-state generated renewable power thus resembles the
payoff structure found in the classic prisoner’s dilemma. Under this
structure, it is rational that players pursue their own interest and not
cooperate with the other players, even if each player would benefit the
greatest if she cooperated with the other players. The payoffs to individual
states interested in supporting renewable power through an RPS law
might be assigned hypothetical values and resemble those in Figure 1 on
the next page.

95. See Mark Muro & Kenan Fikri, Job Creation on a Budget: How Regional Industry
Clusters Can Add Jobs, Bolster Entrepreneurship, and Spark Innovation, in PROJECT ON
STATE AND METROPOLITAN INNOVATION (Brookings-Rockefeller ed., 2011); Mark Muro
& Bruce Katz, The New “Cluster Moment”: How Regional Innovation Clusters Can
Foster the Next Economy, in METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM (Brookings ed., 2010).
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FIGURE 1: HYPOTHETICAL PAYOFFS FACING STATES CHOOSING
BETWEEN RESTRICTING RECS TO IN-STATE GENERATION ONLY
OR ALLOWING RECS TO REFLECT OUT-OF-STATE GENERATION

State A
State B

Allow only
in-state
generation to
satisfy RPS

Allow
TRECs to
satisfy RPS

Allow only instate generation
to satisfy RPS

(A, B)
(1, 1)

(A, B)
(3, 0)

Allow TRECs to
satisfy RPS

(A, B)
(0, 3)

(A, B)
(2, 2)

V. RECS TO REFLECT OUT-OF-STATE GENERATION
A cooperative regional approach, similar to the regional greenhouse
gas emissions trading regimes adopted by states (e.g., RGGI), addresses
the prisoner’s dilemma inherent in a state’s choice as to whether to allow
the generation of renewable power out-of-state to satisfy its state RPS.
Under such an approach, each of the states within a particular region—
the northeastern, Midwestern or Western states, for instance—would
agree to adopt laws or regulations that would allow renewable energy
produced within or delivered into the region to be used by energy suppliers
within their state to satisfy the state’s RPS. This would address the
prisoner’s dilemma issue since every state would know that although it
would be opening its RPS market to out-of-state (but in-region) renewable
power, so would every other state within the region. Provided that the
renewable energy produced in each state is at least somewhat competitive in
price with the renewable power generated in the other states within the
region, this agreement should be sufficient to make each state comfortable
allowing its suppliers to the use of this out-of-state but in-region renewable
energy.
Second, there is some reason to believe that by adopting a regional
trading market, states could be made better off economically than were
they to stick to the creation of single state markets. As mentioned above, a
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regional market might lead to lower costs for renewable power, leading
to ratepayer savings. In addition, however, the regional trading market
might create a larger market for renewable generators and spin-off industries,
such as manufacturing and research facilities. This could create a stronger,
more vibrant and potentially larger renewables industry on the regional
scale than might be created on a state-by-state basis. Supporting this
hypothesis are studies suggesting that economic development is most
successful when pursued on a regional, as opposed to a state-by-state,
basis.96
Finally, location restrictions designed to foster a regional renewable
energy market may have a better chance of withstanding Commerce
Clause scrutiny than similar restrictions designed to enable a state market.
Granted, the Court has indicated that facial discrimination on the basis of
regional boundaries is no different than facial discrimination on the basis
of state boundaries.97 However, by adopting only an in-region delivery
requirement (allowing renewable energy delivered into the region to
comply with the state’s RPS) as opposed to an in-region generation
requirement, the state avoids facial discrimination and the potential that
its law will be struck down as a “per se” violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. An in-region delivery requirement is not facially
discriminatory as renewable energy generated out-of-state but delivered
into the region could be used by energy suppliers to comply with the
state RPS. Under the less stringent Pike v. Bruce Church test prohibiting
undue burdens upon interstate commerce,98 a state enacting an in-region
delivery requirement will have a much better chance of surviving a
Commerce Clause challenge. For one, given the larger regional market
and hence the greater number of out-of-region locations where out-of-

96. See Muro & Fikri, supra note 95; Muro & Katz, supra note 95.
97. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985).
In this case, two New England states authorized bank holding companies located in other
New England states to purchase an in-state bank only if the state in which the holding
company was located afforded reciprocal privileges to the authorizing state’s holding companies.
The Court stated that discrimination by states against bank holding companies located
outside a particular region would violate the dormant Commerce Clause in the same manner
as state discrimination against holding companies merely located out-of-state. Id. (“There
can be little dispute that the dormant Commerce Clause would prohibit a group of States
from establishing a system of regional banking by excluding bank holding companies
from outside the region if Congress had remained completely silent on the subject.”).
This statement is arguably dicta, however, as the Court went on to hold that Congress
had authorized any discrimination that might be involved. Id.
98. Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
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region renewable energy might be imported into the region, there is less
likelihood that the in-region delivery requirement will impose an “undue
burden” upon renewable energy generated located out-of-region.
Furthermore, where such an undue burden might be found, the legitimacy
of the state’s justification for the burden will be stronger. This is
because the state can argue that such an in-region delivery requirement
increases the likelihood that the renewable energy used to comply with
the state’s RPS is displacing dirtier fossil fuel power and hence that the
region will reap the associated environmental benefits of the state RPS.
Here, it may be important that the state contend that a motivation of its
RPS law is the reduction in conventional pollutants, such as particulates,
sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides generated by fossil-fuel burning sources
of energy, and not just reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Because,
as global pollutants, greenhouse gas reductions cannot be limited to any
particular location, much less a region, reliance upon the greenhouse
gas reduction benefits is a less persuasive justification for an in-region
delivery requirement. Reduction of conventional pollutants is a stronger
justification for a state’s in-region delivery restriction as this benefit can
be localized to a particular region.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emergence of multi-state greenhouse gas initiatives highlights the
benefits of addressing climate change through regional, as opposed to
state-level, policy approaches. Specifically, enabling electric utilities to
comply with state greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets on a regional
basis, as is done currently under the northeastern states’ Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, reduces the costs of compliance for those
sources and lowers costs for ratepayers.
While some states—primarily those in the northeast—similarly allow
utilities to comply with state renewable energy mandates through the
purchase of renewable energy generated within the same region, many
others require that the energy be generated within or be delivered into the
state. This state-limited approach to RPS compliance is a manifestation
of a more general characteristic of the structure of state RPS laws to
favor in-state investment in renewable energy. Such a preference is
completely understandable given that renewable energy is not yet cost
competitive with fossil fuel-based energy and that the RPS functions as a
ratepayer subsidy to renewable energy generation. In-state economic
development resulting from renewable energy thus functions as an implicit
“pay back” for this subsidy.
Nevertheless, the in-state investment preference inherent in the location
restrictions found in many state RPS laws has several drawbacks. Not
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only is the efficiency of the market created through the RPS law limited,
leading to higher prices for renewable power (and perhaps lower RPS
targets than might otherwise be supported by voters were prices lower),
but inclusion of state-level preferences run the risk of invalidation by the
courts under the dormant Commerce Clause. While still low, the last
several years have seen an upswing in the number of challenges to statelevel preference provisions in state RPS laws on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds.
Given the objectives of renewable power advocates in continuing the
ratepayer-based subsidization of renewable power, which, as discussed,
is implicitly tied to the ability to channel the resulting investment in a
manner that generates local economic development benefits, as well as a
corresponding desire to minimize the risk of a successful Commerce Clause
challenge, broadening investment preferences so that they operate on the
regional, as opposed to state-level, scale, may be a solution. Location
restrictions designed to foster a regional renewable energy market may
better survive Commerce Clause scrutiny than similar restrictions
designed to enhance a state market. Furthermore, research suggests that
economic development initiatives are most successful when pursued on
a regional, as opposed to a state-level, basis. States should thus be
encouraged to revise the preferences now included in their RPS laws for
renewable energy generated within or delivered to the state and rework
them into preferences for renewable power delivered into the region of
which they are a part.
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